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Few issues in the United States today stir up as much public fervor and debate as the issue
of Domestic Partnership (hereinafter DP) benefits. In January of 2000, Lakewood, Ohio was
embroiled in a contentious debate over a proposed ordinance to provide domestic partnership
benefits to its municipal employees.2 In April of 2002, Cleveland Heights introduced similar
legislation, and is now the first city in Ohio to have enacted such legislation.3 It is anticipated
that the state legislature will respond with a law declaring such city ordinances illegal.4 This
Article explores the domestic partnership issue with respect to how far an Ohio municipality
can go in granting DP benefits.
This Article is divided into five sections. In the first section, the economic, social and
political factors surrounding gay and lesbian rights, especially with respect to DP benefits, are
discussed. These factors revolve around the complex issue of the “right to marry” and the
economic and legal benefits that derive therefrom. The second section deals with possible
legal challenges under Ohio law should a municipality decide to pass a DP benefits ordinance.
This section has two parts–an analysis of whether an ordinance is in conflict with Ohio law,
and if it is, whether it supersedes or is superseded by the conflicting state statute. Because this
issue has been such a high-profile issue over the last decade, Congress has weighed in.
Therefore, questions under federal law and the United States Constitution arise; they are
discussed in the third section. Section four focuses on an examination of challenges that might
arise should the state legislature intervene after a municipality has acted. This section
explores hypothetical state laws that might be passed should opponents of gay and lesbian
civil rights move the fight to the state house and the potential arguments protecting municipal
ordinances from such attack. The last section summarizes the analyses of the Article.
I. INTRODUCTION
It can be argued that the composition and view of “family” in the United States has been
undergoing radical change since World War II. While the traditional view was one of a male
breadwinner with a stay-at-home wife who tended to the children, the current composition of
family is much more complicated. In 1995, almost 25% of families in the United States were
single parent households5 and approximately one-third of all children are born to unmarried

2
Denny Sampson, Lakewood Council Kills Partner Bill, GAY PEOPLES CHRON., Jan. 21,
2000, at 1. One of the leading opponents of the ordinance was quoted as saying he was
concerned about the costs of future litigation if the ordinance passed. “[S]tate and federal
courts are going to have the last word on this issue.” Id.
3

CH Studies Domestic Partner Bill, THE SUN PRESS, Apr. 4, 2002 at A1.

4
As of April 2003, two companion bills have been introduced in the Ohio legislature that
would attempt to declare the Cleveland Heights ordinance and any like it in Ohio invalid.
Anthony Glassman, Ohio ‘Super Doma’ Would Cancel Benefits, GAY PEOPLES CHRON., Mar.
28, 2003 at 1.
5

Dore Hollander, U.S. Families Post-Brady Bunch, in 29 FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECTIVES,
Mar-Apr. 1997, at 50-51.
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parents.6 Unmarried cohabiting couples, both straight and gay, are also an increasing fixture
as an American family. Data shows that by 1997, unmarried heterosexual couples living
together in the United States had increased from 523,000 in 1970 to over 4.1 million in 1997.7
It is estimated that an additional four million same-sex couples live together in the U.S., but
the failure to attempt to document such couples in the U.S. census makes determining an
accurate number difficult.8
A. Benefits of Right to Marry
What constitutes a “family” is a critical issue in a legal sense. When the law recognizes
the familial relationship through the mechanism of marriage, numerous legal and economic
benefits accrue. A complete and thorough history of marriage is well beyond the scope of this
Article. For a legal review, however, the reader is referred to the detailed development
provided by J. H. Baker in An Introduction to English Legal History.9
The contract aspect of the marriage required that witnesses be present at the ceremony.10
These original common law requirements remain in today’s civil contract of marriage.11
Because common law marriage was originally a religious issue by custom,12 it became
entwined in the concept of procreation and continuation of the church. As a consequence,
there is wide public belief in the United States that marriage is a religious ceremony requiring
the approval of a church, as opposed to a civil contract between two people.13
The ability to marry confers major legal benefits under both state and federal law,
including legal protections in recognition of the relationship and significant economic benefits
in terms of property and benefits. Table 1 provides a brief summary of the types of rights and
benefits that accompany the right to marry.14

6

Dominick Vetri, Almost Everything You Always Wanted To Know About Lesbians And
Gay Men, Their Families, And The Law, 26 S.U. L. REV. 1 (1998).
7

Id. at 25.

8

Id. at 25.

9

J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY, (3d ed., 1990). This work
traces the legal development and consequences of marriage law from the 9th century through
to the late 20th century.
10

Id. at 550.

11

See OHIO REVISED CODE ANN. § 3101.10 (West 2000).

12

BAKER, supra note 10, at 545.

13

JOHN BOSWELL, SAME-SEX UNIONS

IN

PRE-MODERN EUROPE (1994), Introduction, pg

.xxii.
14

See Vetri, supra note 7, at 46. Most of the rights, privileges, benefits, and
responsibilities in Table 1 relate to state laws. During the debate on Defense of Marriage Act
[hereinafter “DOMA”], the federal General Accounting Office (GAO) did an electronic search
of all U.S. statutes in which marital status is relevant. 1,221 such statutes were found. They
classified such statutes into the following thirteen categories: (1) Social Security and Related
Programs, (2) Housing, and Food Stamps, (3) Veterans’ Benefits, (4) Taxation, (5) Federal
Civilian and Military Service Benefits, (6) Immigration, Naturalization, and Aliens, (7)
Indians, (8) Trade, Commerce, and Intellectual Property, (9) Financial Disclosure and Conflict
of Interest, (10) Crimes and Family Violence, (11) Loans, Guarantees, and Payments in
Agriculture, (12) Federal Natural Resources and Related Laws, and (13) Miscellaneous Laws.
See Defense of Marriage Act, Letter Report, GAO/OGC-97-16 (Jan. 31, 1997).
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B. Marriage Versus Domestic Partnership Benefits
As can be seen from Table 1, unmarried couples face a significant economic and legal
disadvantage. Of course, heterosexual couples are free to obtain the benefits associated with
marriage by entering into the marriage contract. For gay and lesbian couples, however, there
are few, if any, mechanisms to overcome the disadvantages.
TABLE 1: EXAMPLES OF RIGHTS AND BENEFITS ASSOCIATED WITH MARRIAGE
•

Legal Recognition of Relationship
the right to make medical decisions
for an incapacitated partner
the right to visit a partner in
hospitals and other public and
private facilities
domestic violence protections

•

•

right of action for wrongful death
and/or loss of consortium and
ability to recover emotional distress
losses as a bystander witness when
one’s partner is seriously injured or
killed through negligence15
the
marital
communication
privilege

•

•

•

•

•
•

•

•

child custody and visitation rights

•

•

immigration rights

•

•
•

use of step-parent adoption laws
divorce protections

•
•

Property and Money Concerns
the right to employment fringe benefits
for the non-employed spouse, including
health insurance and pension benefits
automatic inheritance rights under
intestacy laws
assumption of a deceased spouse’s
pension
spousal
benefits
under
universal
government programs such as social
security, Medicare, unemployment, and
welfare

the right not to be taxed for employer
health insurance benefits extended to
one’s partner
exemption from inheritance taxes on
partner’s death
income tax benefits including joint
returns and deductions and exemptions
automatic transfer of housing lease
eligibility for joint automobile and
homeowner’s insurance coverage

The disparity in rights afforded to gay and lesbian couples has led to a significant push on
two fronts: a fight for the right to marry and a fight for DP benefits. While the fight for the
right to marry is not the focus of this Article, it is a critical background against which to place
the issues associated with domestic partnership rights. A brief summary of the situation with
respect to gay and lesbian marriage rights demonstrates why DP benefit issues are now
coming to the forefront nationally.

15

On August 9, 2001, a San Francisco Superior Court held that Sharon Smith could
proceed to trial in her lawsuit for the wrongful death of her same-sex partner, Diane Alexis
Whipple. This ruling marks the first time in the country a court has held that excluding all
same-sex partners from the right to bring a wrongful death suit violates the constitutional
principle of equal protection. See Smith v. Knoller, National Center for Lesbian Rights, at
http://www.nclrights.org/cases/smithknoller.html> (last visited November 10, 2002).
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1. The Fight for the Right to Marry
Until 1993, it was a common assumption that marriage would remain a sanctum
sanctorum on the American legal landscape.16 In that year, however, the Supreme Court of
Hawaii handed down its landmark decision in Baehr v. Lewin.17 In this decision, the court
reversed the lower courts’ decisions to grant a judgment against Baehr’s request for a marriage
license based solely on the pleadings.18 Hawaii’s Supreme Court held that Hawaii’s
Constitution provided the basis for the argument that Hawaii’s denial of marriage licenses to
same-sex couples was a violation of equal protection principles.19 The State would therefore
have to “in accordance with the ‘strict scrutiny’ standard . . . overcome the presumption that
Hawaii Revised Statutes § 572-1 is unconstitutional by demonstrating that it furthers
compelling state interests and is narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgments of
constitutional rights.”20 On remand, the court found no rational basis for denying same-sex
couples the right to marry.21 Before the supreme court could rule, however, on the State’s
appeal, an amendment to the Hawaii Constitution was passed via initiative, to allow the
legislature of Hawaii to restrict marriage to same sex couples.22 Subsequently, the Hawaii
Supreme Court found that the amendment made prohibition against same-sex marriage in
section 572-1 of the Hawaii Revised Statutes constitutional.23
The initial success in Hawaii led to a similar filing in Alaska.24 Concern about the
application of the U.S. Constitution’s “Full Faith and Credit” Clause being used to force other
states to accept same-sex marriage as legal caused an uproar in conservative religious groups
around the country.25 In 1996, the United States Congress capitulated to political pressure
from the conservative religious right and passed the Defense of Marriage Act (hereinafter
DOMA).26 The impact of DOMA on municipal powers to pass domestic partnership benefit
ordinances is extremely limited and is not discussed in this Article. Simultaneously, a
nationwide effort was launched to have states pass laws or amend their constitution to prevent

16
See Dean v. Dist. of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C., 1995) (upholding the case for
failure to state a claim upheld); Storrs v. Holcomb, 245 A.2d 479 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)
(failing to join the state agency responsible for marriage registration as a necessary party).
17

Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).

18

Id. at 68.

19

Id. at 68.

20

Id. at 583.

21

Baehr v. Miike, CIV No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *1 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996
1996). Subsequent litigation was named Baehr v. Miike because the newly appointed State
Director of Health was substituted as a party defendant.
22
See Human Rights Campaign Quarterly at 4 (Spring 1999). The state legislature in 1997
passed a bill placing a referendum on the November 1998 ballot which purportedly would give
the state legislature the constitutional power to elect to restrict marriage to opposite-sex
couples. The Hawaii referendum was passed 69 percent to 29 percent on November 2, 1998.
23

Baehr v. Miike, 994 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1999).

24

Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998)

25

Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Marriage Project Fact Sheet (last
modified, September, 1997) <http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/documents/record?
record=49>.
26

28 U.S.C. §1738C (1996).
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gay marriages from being recognized.27 As of January of 2000, thirty states had passed such
laws or amendments, including Hawaii.28 In 2000, Nevada also passed similar legislation.
Ohio has not yet passed such legislation.29
2. The Domestic Partnership Benefits Approach
Simultaneously with the push for marriage rights, a second avenue was being pursued
within the gay and lesbian community to try and address at least the economic rights
associated with marriage.30 This effort is the domestic partnership effort. This approach,
criticized by some as a “separate but equal” situation, allows same-sex (and sometimes
opposite-sex) couples to receive at least health and some retirement benefits equal to married
couples. Even though the domestic partnership approach does not provide equality for samesex couples, it is significantly easier to successfully argue for some of the rights gays and
lesbians are currently denied. Unlike marriage, it can be enacted through governmental units
below the state level (such as municipalities) and by private companies. In addition, even
though there has been successful litigation forcing entities to provide domestic partnership
benefits on a range of equal protection and non-discrimination arguments,31 this approach is
significantly less litigious. The success of this approach is best demonstrated by the fact that
currently, ten states, over seventy municipalities, and three hundred private companies
(including 100 of the Fortune 500) offer some type of domestic partnership benefits to their
employees.32
3. The Shift to Partnership Versus Marriage
While there is a tension between the concept of domestic partnership and the right to
marry, the right-to-marry litigation seems to produce a strong movement towards the
partnership option. Starting with Baehr, some politicians have argued that the need to treat all

27

Cf. Stanly Kurtz, The Right Balance, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE (August 1, 2001)
available at <http://www.nationalreview.com/contributors/kurtz080101.shtml> (last visited
April 9, 2003).
28

1999 Anti-Marriage Bills Status Report, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund,
(last modified, Dec. 1999), at http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/pages/documents/
record?record=319 (hereinafter Lambda Legal Defense Fund). The states are Alaska, Arizona,
Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Mississippi, Montana, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Utah, Virginia and Washington. Id.
29

Anti-Gay marriage legislation was introduced in the Ohio House during both the 199697 and 1998-99 sessions (HB 160). Both times the bill was blocked and died in committee.
The legislation was reintroduced in the 2000-2001 session in both the House (HB 234) and the
Senate (SB 240). In October 2001, HB 234 was passed by the State House of Representatives
by a vote of 43 to 23 and referred to the Senate. See Glassman, supra note 4, at 1.
30

Cf. Carnegie Mellon University, Domestic Partnerships and Same Sex Marriages, (last
modified
March,
1997)
at
http://www-2.cs.smu.edu/afs/cs/user/scotts/domesticpartners/manpage.html.
31

See University of Alaska v. Tumeo, 933 P.2d 1147 (Alaska 1997).

32

Partners Task Force for Gay and Lesbian Couples, Domestic Parters Benefits Section,
available at <http://www.buddybuddy.com/toc.html> (last visited March 2001) (hereinafter
Partners Task Force for Gay and Lesbian Couples).
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people equally requires some type of partnership recognition short of marriage.33 This concept
reached an important turning point in Baker v. Vermont.34 In Baker, the Supreme Court of
Vermont declared:
We hold that the State is constitutionally required to extend to same-sex couples
the common benefits and protections that flow from marriage under Vermont law.
Whether this ultimately takes the form of inclusion within the marriage laws
themselves or a parallel “domestic partnership” system or some equivalent
statutory alternative, rests with the Legislature. Whatever system is chosen,
however, must conform with the constitutional imperative to afford all Vermonters
the common benefit, protection, and security of the law.35
After this decision, the Vermont Legislature passed civil union legislation in 1999 that
created the first legal recognition of gay and lesbian partners on a statewide level.36 Because
partnership “status” can be afforded without arguing the sanctity of marriage or entering the
debate on the religions and moral dimensions of marriage, it is a much more palatable political
option. For example, Connecticut is now exploring the civil union approach pioneered in
Vermont.37 Therefore, it is highly possible that domestic partnership and civil union issues
will now move to the forefront of the legal fight for gay and lesbian civil rights.
II. CHALLENGES TO GAY AND LESBIAN RIGHTS ORDINANCES UNDER EXISTING OHIO LAW
Recent examples show that gay and lesbian rights activists have the most success acting
on a local level. As this seems to be the most effective political approach for the time being, it
is critical for those both for and against such legislation to know just how far an Ohio
municipality can go in passing such ordinances. This section explores this question with
respect to Ohio law using a three-step process. First, it is necessary to know what options
exist in terms of such ordinances (e.g. exactly what rights are being granted). Second, the
options must be compared to existing state law to determine if it is within the power of the
municipality to enact. Third, even if current state law allows an option to be exercised, it is
not unreasonable to expect that the action of a municipality may provoke a response at the
level of the state legislature, or even in the U.S. Congress, as demonstrated by the Hawaii
situation. This section deals with the first two prongs of the analysis. The third prong, state
reaction and federal issues, is addressed in sections three and four of this Article.

33
See Vetri, supra note 7, at 55-56. At the time the Hawaii Legislature referred the
constitutional amendment to the people in 1997, Hawaii legislators adopted limited domestic
partner benefits to justify their anti-gay marriage amendment proposal. Id. It was their view
that the creation of such limited domestic partner benefits would be viewed by the courts as an
appropriate compromise to justify a prohibition on same-sex marriages. Id. The domestic
partner benefits include provisions for (1) hospital visitation and medical decisions; (2) ability
to sue for wrongful death; (3) inheritance rights, in case one of the partners dies intestate; and
(4) holding property by tenancy in the entirety. Id. The Governor of Hawaii after the
referendum vote suggested that the statutory benefits be broadened to cover “everything but”
marriage.” Id.
34

Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).

35

Id. at 867.

36

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15. §§ 1201-1207 (1999).

37

Connecticut May Recognize Same-Sex Couples, GAY PEOPLE’S CHRON., Mar. 16, 2001,

at 1.
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A. The Range of Options for Ohio Municipal Ordinances
It is clear that an issue such as the right to marry is a state issue beyond the scope of a
municipality. Other issues of rights, however, are much less certain. In general, based on the
experience and example of the over seventy municipalities that have already passed domestic
partnership ordinances,38 the range of options theoretically open to Ohio municipalities can be
loosely grouped into three categories:
(a)

prohibitions on discrimination in housing, employment or other public
accommodations within the municipality on the basis of sexual
orientation;

(b)

grants of benefits to the domestic partners of municipal employees
commensurate with those offered the spouses of married employees; and

(c)

requirements that public entities and private entities contracting with the
municipality provide benefits to employees with domestic partners
commensurate with those offered to married employees.39

Each one of these options will be explored under existing state law.
B. Authority of Ohio Municipalities
In Ohio, municipalities have been given extensive authority through the “Home Rule”
amendment to the state constitution.40 Under Article XVIII, section 3 of the Ohio
Constitution, a municipality is vested with “all powers of local self-government and to adopt
and enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are
not in conflict with general laws.”41 Section 7 provides that “any municipality may frame or
adopt or amend a charter for its government and may, subject to the provisions of section 3 of
this article, exercise thereunder all powers of local self government.”42 These two sections,
combined and separately, set up the scope of authority for municipalities, and have been the
subject of significant litigation in the state. Through a series of cases, starting with the
seminal case Fitzgerald v. Cleveland,43 the courts have defined the spheres of power for both
the state and municipalities. The authority of municipalities may be summarized as follows:
1)

In matters of substantive local self-government, all municipalities,
whether chartered under Article XVIII, section 7, have ultimate
authority, subject only to Constitutional limitations.44 In these matters,
ordinances that conflict with state law supercede the state law.45

38

See Partners Task Force for Gay and Lesbian Couples, supra note 35.

39

S.F. ADMIN. CODE § 12B.1(b) (1997). This type of ordinance was passed in 1997 by the
City of San Francisco. Specifically, the ordinance prohibits the City from contracting with
companies that do not provide benefits to their employees’ domestic partners to the same
extent they provide benefits to employees’ spouses. Id.
40

OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 7.

41

OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3

42

OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 7.

43

Fitzgerald v. Cleveland, 103 N.E.512 (Ohio 1913).

44

The Supreme Court of Ohio clarified any doubt about the construction of Article 18,
Section 3 in its per curiam decision in State ex rel. Paluf v. Feneli, 630 N.E.2d 708 (Ohio

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol50/iss2/3
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2)

In procedural matters associated with local self-government, those
municipalities that are chartered under Article XVIII, section 7 have
ultimate authority. Non-chartered municipalities, however, must follow
state laws on procedural issues.46

3)

Any municipality may pass ordinances dealing with issues of “police,
sanitary and other similar regulations,” commonly called police powers.
In these areas, however, the ordinances must not conflict with state law.
If a conflict between state law and an ordinance on this subject arises,
the state law will prevail.47

173

C. Challenges Under Existing Ohio Law
Given the broad grant of power to Ohio municipalities, there are only two avenues of
attack against an ordinance. First, if the ordinance is in conflict with State law, the plaintiff
can argue that State law preempts the municipal ordinance by arguing that: (1) the ordinance is
an exercise of police power, and therefore subject to general state law; and/or (2) that the
ordinance has significant effects outside the municipality and therefore an area of general state
interest and subject to state legislative control. If there is no conflict with state law, the
argument becomes much more difficult for the plaintiff. The only available attack in this latter
situation is to argue that the ordinance is not an exercise of local self-government at all, and
therefore is beyond the power granted to the municipality to enact. These two attacks will be
analyzed separately from each of the three types of ordinances previously described in section
two of this Article.
1. Ordinances Prohibiting Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation
Is there a conflict with existing state law? There are numerous provisions in State laws
that prohibit discrimination on the basis of any of a number of listed characteristics.48
1994), when it stated, “The phrase ‘not in conflict with general laws’ does not modify the
‘powers of local government’ language of the Constitution.” Id. at 711.
45

It is important to note that just because the subject of an ordinance has local impacts
does not mean it is an exercise of local self-government. The court has set forth the following
test:
To determine whether legislation is such as falls within the area of local selfgovernment, the result of such legislation or the result of the proceedings thereunder
must be considered. If the result affects only the municipality itself, with no
extraterritorial effects, the subject is clearly within the power of local self-government
and is a matter for the determination of the municipality. However, if the result is not
so confined it becomes a matter for the General Assembly.
Beechwood v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections, 148 N.E.2d 921 (Ohio 1958); see also State ex
rel. v. Tablack, 714 N.E.2d 917 (Ohio 1999).
46

Cf. Treska v. Trumble, 447 N.E.2d 1283 (Ohio 1983). See also State ex rel. Zeigler v.
Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 621 N.E.2d 391 (Ohio 1993).
47

Cf. Vill. of Sheffield v. Rowland, 716 N.E.2d 1121 (Ohio 1999).

48

Cf. Vill. of Sheffield v. Rowland, 716 N.E.2d 1121 (Ohio 1999). The following is a
brief review of the sections of the Ohio Revised Code with such prohibitions:
§ 125.111: Requires every contract with the state to contain a prohibition against
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, age, disability, national origin, or
ancestry (see also § 153.59); to have a clause prohibiting intimidation or retaliation
against employees on account of race, color, religion, sex, age, disability, national
origin, or ancestry; and requiring an Affirmative Action plan.
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However, nowhere in state law is there a protection against discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation. The Supreme Court of Ohio has explicitly indicated that Ohio law does not
protect gays and lesbians in Greenwood v. Taft, Stettinius & Hollister.49 However, there is no
§ 153.59 Requiring that every contract for or on behalf of the state, or any township,
county, or municipal corporation of the state, for the construction, alteration, or repair
of any public building or public work in the state shall contain provisions by which the
contractor agrees not to discriminate in hiring on the basis of race, creed, sex,
disability or color, and to ensure that no contractor, subcontractor, or any person on a
contractor’s or subcontractor’s behalf shall so discriminate.
§ 340.12 Prohibiting any board of alcohol, drug addiction, and mental health services
or any agency, corporation, or association under contract with such a board from
discriminating in the provision of services, in employment, or contract on the basis of
race, color, sex, creed, disability, national origin, or the inability to pay.
§ 3911.16 Prohibiting discrimination in the provision of life insurance on the basis of
color or African descent.
§ 3911.18 Prohibiting life insurance companies from discriminating between any
insured persons of the same class and of equal expectation of life.
§ 3999.16 Prohibiting insurance companies, from knowingly using underwriting
standards or rates that to discriminate against any handicapped person. (Does not
prevent reasonable classifications of handicapped person for determining insurance
rates.)
§ 4111.17 Prohibiting discrimination in the payment of wages on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, age, national origin, or ancestry.
§ 4112.022 Prohibiting any educational institution from discriminating on the basis of
disability.
§ 4112.02 Prohibiting any employer from discriminating on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, national origin, handicap, age, or ancestry and
§ 4112.14 Prohibits discrimination in employment based on age for individuals aged
forty or older (Note, a change to this law passed in 1996 was struck down as
unconstitutional in toto in State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward,
715 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 1999) on grounds not related to these provisions. The
proposed new version of the law also contained similar prohibitions)
§ 4757.07 Prohibiting Discrimination by the counselor and social worker board and its
professional standards committees on the basis if race, color, religion, sex, national
origin, disability, or age.
§ 5126.07 Prohibiting Discrimination by any county board of mental retardation and
developmental disabilities or any agency, corporation, or association under contract
with a county board of mental retardation and developmental disabilities based on
race, color, sex, creed, disability, national origin, or the inability to pay.
Greenwood v. Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, 663 N.E.2d 1030 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995).
49

In Greenwood, the plaintiff alleged he had been discharged from his job as an attorney in
Taft’s law firm because of his sexual orientation and in retaliation for working on the defeat of
“Issue 3,” the Cincinnati ant-gay rights Charter amendment. Greenwood, 663 N.E.2d at 1031.
In upholding the lower court’s dismissal of the case, the Court stated the “Ohio civil rights
statutes, R.C. Chapter 4112, do not include sexual orientation among their protections. In fact,
while R.C. 4112.02 prohibits discrimination based on “handicap,” that term is defined
specifically to exclude homosexuality, bisexuality, and other sexual disorders or
dysfunctions.” Id, citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4112.01(A)(13) and (16)(b) (Anderson
2002).
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state law or regulation denying protections based on sexual orientation. While this is a subtle
distinction, it is critical in determining if a conflict exists.
The Supreme Court of Ohio has declared that “[i]n determining if a municipal ordinance is
in conflict with the general state statute, ‘the test is whether the ordinance permits or licenses
that which the statute forbids and prohibits, and vice versa.’”50 Following this rule, one could
argue that because there is no law allowing discrimination based on sexual orientation, an
ordinance prohibiting such discrimination would not be in conflict with state law.
While there is no case law from Ohio on the issue of a municipal non-discrimination
ordinance containing protections for gays and lesbians, there are both public proceedings and
case law that indicate that the courts would uphold such an action. For example, the Public
Utilities Commission of Ohio (hereinafter PUCO), acting under the requirements of Ohio
Revised Code section 123.111 and section 153.59 has included in contracts with the state the
required non-discrimination statement with a prohibition against discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation added.51 Similarly, the PUCO allows the inclusion of a similar statement in
contracts between municipalities and private companies.52
More to the point, Cuyahoga and Summit Counties53 and thirteen cities currently have
non-discrimination ordinances that protect gays and lesbians that have not been challenged by
opponents in court.54, The most well known Ohio city to deal with this issue is Cincinnati. In
March of 1991, Cincinnati passed an ordinance commonly known as the Equal Employment
Opportunity Ordinance, which mandated that the city could not discriminate in its own hiring
practices on the basis of a list of factors, including sexual orientation.55 This was followed by
a Human Rights Ordinance that prohibited private discrimination in employment, housing or
50
Fondessy Enters., Inc. v. Oregon, 492 N.E.2d 797 Syllabus (Ohio 1986) (quoting
Struthers v. Sokol, 140 N.E.2d 519 (Ohio 1923).
51

See e.g., In the Matter of the Commission Investigation and Establishment of Programs
for Ohioans with Communication Impairments Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, 1991
Ohio PUC LEXIS 1180.
52
An example of a non-discrimination clause from a contract from the City of Vermillion
reads:
shall not discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment because of
race, religion, color, sex, sexual orientation, national origin, handicap, age, or
Vietnam-era veteran status. The Contractor will ensure that applicants are hired and
that employees are treated during employment without regard to their race, religion,
color, sex sexual orientation, national origin, handicap, age, or Vietnam era veteran
status.
In the Matter of the Corridor Project for the Modernization of a Grade Crossing and a Closure
to Vehicles at Grade Crossings, Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, 1996 Ohio PUC LEXIS
50 at 15.
53

On May 7, 2001, the Summit County Council voted unanimously to prohibit
discrimination based on sexual orientation in its public work force.
54

Athens (1998); Cleveland (March 23, 1994), Ordinance No. 77-94, a law signed
December 24, 1996 also makes discrimination a misdemeanor crime; Cleveland Heights
(January 1995); Columbus (August 1984), City Code Ch. 2325 (pub. acc. & housing), June
1992 employment, Dayton (Executive Order); Lakewood (1997); Oberlin (date not provided);
North Olmstead (1996); Toledo (12/8/98); Westlake (1997); Yellow Springs (November
1979); Town Charter, §29; and Youngstown (early 90s). Lambda Legal Defense Fund, supra
note 29.
55
The Ordinance was also repealed by local ballot issue (Issue 3). Equal. Found. of
Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997) (repealing Cincinnati
Ordinance No. 79-1991).
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public accommodation based on sexual orientation.56 None of these ordinances were
challenged in the courts under state law. In fact, because the validity of the ordinance was
never in question, opponents to the ordinance introduced a proposed amendment to the city
charter via initiative to prohibit the city from designating gays and lesbians as a protected
class.57
Based on past practice in the state, since the existence of several municipal nondiscrimination ordinances and since the issue was litigated without a challenge to the validity
of an ordinance ever being raised, an ordinance prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation is not in conflict with Ohio general law. Hence, whether the action is a
matter of substantive local self-government or a police power is not an issue. The question of
what the situation would be should a state law be passed to prohibit such local ordinances is
discussed in Section four.
Is an ordinance an issue of local self government? Since no conflict with general state law
exists, any remaining challenge to a municipality’s non-discrimination ordinance would have
to rest on the grounds that the issue did not involve any local interests. However, these
ordinances prohibit discrimination in housing and employment within the municipality. Given
the fact that several of these ordinances currently exist in Ohio, an argument appears
unrealistic.
2. Ordinances Granting Benefits to the Domestic Partners of Municipal Employees
Is there a conflict with existing state law? There is one municipality that currently offer
domestic partner benefits to municipal employees: Cleveland Heights.58 While there are
existing Ohio laws regarding minimum wage and various other aspects of wages, there is no
state law dealing with benefits to municipal employees that determines which non-employee
partners can be covered by an employer. Consequently, there does not appear to be a conflict
with existing state law. This type of ordinance, however, may be subject to challenges under
federal law as discussed in Section three. In addition, this type of ordinance and the potential
political machinations that it could produce are further explored in Section four.
Is ordinance within power of municipality? The issue of whether the scope of municipal
authority with respect to wages for municipal employees was litigated from several different
angles. The most pertinent case to the issue of an ordinance providing domestic partnership
benefits to municipal employees is Northern Ohio Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn. v. Parma.59
In this case, the court held that Parma’s ordinance allowing pay to city workers on military
leave, which conflicted with a state law on the topic, was valid and superceded the state law
because it pertained to “a matter of substantive local self government.”60 Further, the court
stated that “the state’s concern in this matter is not sufficient to interfere with the
municipality’s fiscal decision concerning wages paid its employees.”61 Hence, it is very likely
that the Supreme Court of Ohio would uphold an ordinance granting benefits to the domestic
56

Cincinnati Ordinance No. 490 (1992). On March 8, 1995, after the passage of Issue 3,
the city council, by a vote of five to four, removed the sexual orientation clause from the
Human Rights Ordinance.
57

This initiative, known as “Issue 3,” was passed by over 60% of the voters in November
1993, and held to be constitutional even in the light of Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)
(striking down a similar amendment to the Colorado Constitution as in violation of the U.S.
Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause). See Equal. Found. of Cincinnati, Inc. v. Cincinnati,
54 F. 3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated by 518 U.S. 1001 (1996).
58

See Lambda Legal Defense Fund, supra note 29.

59

402 N.E.2d 519 (Ohio 198).

60

Id. at 520.

61

Id. at 525.
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partners of municipal employees as a proper exercise of municipal authority under the Ohio
Constitution.
3. Ordinances Requiring Benefits to the Domestic Partners of Employees of
Contractors with the Municipality
Is there a conflict with existing state law? This issue represents a slightly more
complicated fact pattern for analysis under existing law. Two sections of the Ohio Revised
Code contain provisions requiring that non-discrimination clauses be included in municipal
contracts. As noted above, the Ohio Revised Code section 125.111 requires “every contract
for or on behalf of the state or any of its political subdivisions for any purchase” to include a
clause that states the contractor will not discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,
age, disability, national origin, or ancestry.62 Similarly, Ohio Revised Code section 153.59
requires that “every contract for or on behalf of the state, or any township, county, or
municipal corporation of the state, for the construction, alteration, or repair of any public
building or public work in the state” must contain a similar provision.63 Therefore, the
question arises as to whether a municipal ordinance that adds the requirement that the
contractor provide benefits for the domestic partners of employees equivalent to those for
married employees is in conflict with either of these laws. Since there is an issue of potential
conflict, the argument over the ordinance enters issues not yet discussed in detail. These
issues are: how to determine whether the ordinance conflicts with the state statute(s), and if a
conflict exists, does state law or the ordinance have ultimate authority.
The standard rule for determining whether a state statute and municipal ordinance
conflicts was set forth in Struthers64 and was reaffirmed in 1986 in Fondessy Enterprises.65
The rule asks “whether the ordinance permits or licenses that which the statute forbids and
prohibits, and vice versa.”66 In applying this standard, adding an additional requirement to the
contract should not be viewed as a conflict.
The opponents of the ordinance, however, argue that the list of protected classes set forth
in both the Ohio Revised Code sections 125.111 and 153.59 explicitly exclude sexual
orientation through the legislature’s definition of “disability.” The pertinent sections of the
Ohio Revised Code are:
§ 4112.01(A)(13). “Disability” means a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities . . .67
§ 4112.01(A)(16)(b). “Physical or mental impairment” does not include any of
the following: (i) Homosexuality and bisexuality . . .68
In Greenwood v. Taft, Stettinius & Hollister,69 the court seized upon this language to
dismiss a claim of discrimination based on sexual orientation.70 The plaintiff alleged he was

62

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 125.111 (Anderson 2002).

63

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 153.59 (Anderson 2002).

64

Struthers, 140 N.E. at 519.

65

Fondessy Enterprises, 492 N.E.2d at 797.

66

Id. at 213.

67

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.01(A)(13) (Anderson 2002).

68

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.01(A)(16)(b) (Anderson 2002).

69

Greenwood, 663 N.E.2d at 1030.

70

Id.
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discharged from his job because he was (1) gay and, (2) in retaliation for working on the
defeat of “Issue 3,” the anti-gay civil rights ordinance in Cincinnati.71 In upholding the
dismissal of the case, the Ohio Supreme Court stated that “the Ohio civil rights statutes, Ohio
Revised Code chapter 4112, do not include sexual orientation among their protections.72 In
fact, while R.C. 4112.02 prohibits discrimination based on ‘handicap,’ that term is defined
specifically to exclude homosexuality.”73
Contrary to Greenwood, opponents say that the legislature’s clear intent was to exclude
sexual orientation as a disability.74 However, this is significantly different than stating that the
legislature intended to explicitly prevent gays and lesbians from being included. Furthermore,
there is significant precedent of including additional terms in state contracts, including
protections based on sexual orientation.75 If in fact, the legislature had intended to explicitly
block the inclusion of sexual orientation in non-discrimination clauses in contracts, the
common practice by the Ohio Public Utilities Commission of including such clauses would
have already been held invalid. Finally, the Greenwood case can be distinguished because it
did not deal with a conflict between a state law and an ordinance. Instead, it pertained only
with the question of whether there were protections in state law for gays and lesbians.76
Hence, it could be argued that there could be no conflict with an ordinance requiring equal
treatment because the court has already held no such coverage is present in state law.77
The opponents of the ordinance may argue that the list of protected categories in Ohio
Revised Code sections 125.111 and 153.59 is actually an exclusive list and therefore, adding
to that list represents a conflict. To support this argument, the opponents can cite Zeigler in
which the court held that Ohio Revised Code section 731.12, which sets forth a list of
qualifications for village council members, represents an exclusive list.78 Therefore, a Fairfax
ordinance adding to that list was in conflict with state law.79 While this approach might be
initially appealing, there are strong arguments against it.
First, this line of reasoning distorts the court’s established standards in construing a
statute. As stated in State ex rel. Purdy v. Clermont County Bd. of Elections.

71

Id.

72

Id. at 1032.

73

Id. at 1032, (citing OHIO REV. CODE § 4112.01(A)(13), (16)(b) (Anderson 2002)).

74

Greenwood, 663 N.E.2d at 1030.

75

An example of a non-discrimination clause from a contract from the City of Vermillion
reads:
[S]hall not discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment because of
race, religion, color, sex, sexual orientation, national origin, handicap, age, or
Vietnam-era veteran status.
In the Matter of the Corridor Project for the Modernization of a Grade Crossing and a Closure
to Vehicles at Grade Crossings, Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, 1996 Ohio PUC LEXIS
50 at 15 (emphasis added). See also In the Matter of the Commission Investigation and
Establishment of Programs for Ohioans with Communication Impairments Public Utilities
Commission of Ohio, 1991 Ohio PUC LEXIS 1180 (in which a similar non-discrimination
clause covering sexual orientation is included in a state contract).
76

Greenwood, 665 N.E.2d at 1032.

77

Id.

78

Zeigler, 621 N.E.2d at 1199.

79

Id.
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The paramount consideration in construing a statute is legislative intent. ‘In
determining legislative intent, the court first looks to the language in the statute
and the purpose to be accomplished. If the meaning of a statute is unambiguous
and definite, then it must be applied as written and no further interpretation is
appropriate.’80
The plain language of Ohio Revised Code sections 125.111 and 153.59 is unambiguous. The
statutes require a clause in all contracts that the contractor does not discriminate.81 This
unambiguous language means that any attempt to extend the meaning as a prohibition against
including other contract clauses would be inappropriate. Further, the attempt to construe a
requirement in Ohio law prohibiting discrimination against specific groups as a prohibition
against including others would conflict with the entire purpose of civil rights legislation: to
prevent discrimination. By making the list exclusive as opposed to a minimum, the court
would be, in essence, advocating discrimination against all groups not listed.
If the ordinance conflicts, does state law or the ordinance prevail? Even if it is assumed
that there is a conflict between the ordinance and state law, it does not mean that the ordinance
is automatically invalid. In those instances where an ordinance is found in conflict with state
law, a further inquiry is necessary. Once the conflict is identified, the issue turns to the basis
for municipal authority.
Is this ordinance a local self-government procedural or substantive issue? It seems clear
from the fact that the ordinance in question deals with contracting with the municipality that
such an ordinance does deal with an issue of local government. Uncharted municipalities,
however, cannot pass ordinances in conflict with state law on procedural issues.82 At its heart,
this issue deals with the contractual powers of the municipality. At first glance, this would
seem to be a substantive issue of local self-government.
There is Ohio case law that supports the contention that issues of pay for contractors
employed by a municipality are covered in the sphere of substantive local self-government. In
Dies Electric Co. v. City of Akron,83 the Supreme Court of Ohio dealt with a conflict between
a city ordinance and a state law specifying conditions of a contract. In finding that the
municipal ordinance prevailed over state law the court stated:
It is our conclusion that the retainage of funds to guarantee work executed on a
contract for the improvement of municipal property is a matter embraced within
the field of local self-government. Moreover, it is well established that this charter
city had the power to contract and that the terms of its ordinance should be
considered a part of that contract. Therefore, a charter municipality, in the
exercise of its powers of local self-government under Section 3 of Article XVIII of
the Constitution of Ohio, may, pursuant to its charter, enact retainage provisions
for a contract for improvements to municipal property which differ from the
retainage provisions of R.C. §153.13.84
Yet, even if it is established that the ordinance is a substantive issue of local self-government,
it does not automatically mean the ordinance will prevail. As noted above, an ordinance that

80
Purdy, 673 N.E.2d 1351, 1353 (Ohio 1996) (quoting State ex rel. Zonders v. Del. Cty.
Bd. of Elections, 630 N.E.2d 313, 315 (Ohio 1994); State ex rel. Herman v. Klopfleisch, 651
N.E.2d 995, 997 (Ohio 1995)).
81

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 125.111, 153.59 (Anderson 2002).

82

Benevolent Ass’n, 402 N.E.2d at 519.

83

Dies Electric Co. v. City of Akron, 405 N.E.2d 1026 (Ohio 1980).

84

Id. at 1029. See also LaPolla v. Davis, 89 N.E.2d 706 (Common Pleas Ct., Mahoning
Co., 1948).
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has local impacts beyond its boarders is invalidated by a conflicting state law under the
statewide concern doctrine even if it concerns a local self-governance issue.85
When dealing with an ordinance forcing contractors to provide domestic partnership
benefits, it is very possible that the court would hold government contracting requirements to
be an issue of statewide concern. There is precedent to support this argument. In State ex rel.
Evans v. Moore,86 the Court invalidated an Upper Arlington ordinance that exempted the city
from the state’s prevailing wage law.87 The court reasoned that the General Assembly, in
enacting the prevailing wage law, had “manifested a statewide concern for the integrity of the
collective bargaining process in the building and construction trades.”88 It can be argued that
the state manifested a similar statewide concern with non-discrimination issues in contracts by
enacting Ohio Revised Code sections 125.111 and 153.59. Attempting to require additional
benefits for employees of private contractors would have effects outside the municipality
similarly to refusing to follow state laws dealing with compensation of employees of private
contractors.
While such an ordinance has not been before the court in Ohio, there has been litigation
over this exact type of ordinance in California. In Air Transport Association of America v.
City and County of San Francisco,89 the airline industry, which contracted with the city for
service at the San Francisco Airport, challenged the ordinance.90 The ordinance was
challenged on the grounds that it had impermissible extraterritorial effects, and therefore it
was beyond the power of the city to enact and preempted by state law. 91
In finding that the ordinance was within the power of the city to enact, the U.S. District
Court stated:
Because the Ordinance reaches beyond the boundaries of San Francisco only by
placing conditions on who may enter into airport-related contracts with the City, it
falls within the City’s proprietary powers. Although Plaintiffs clearly anticipate
that the Ordinance will have extraterritorial effects, for example, by inducing an
airline to offer domestic partner benefits nationwide, these possible effects do not
establish that the City has acted beyond its powers under the California
Constitution.92
The similarities between this case and the hypothetical ordinance passed by an Ohio
municipality indicate that there is precedent for holding that the municipality has the power to
legislate in this arena and is not preempted by state law.
Even if an Ohio court, however, followed Air Transport and found that the ordinance dealt
sufficiently with local issues and did not violate the state interest doctrine, there remains an
avenue by which the ordinance could be struck down in favor of the competing state law. In

85

Cf. Beechwood v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections, 148 N.E.2d 921 (Ohio 1958).

86

431 N.E.2d 311 (Ohio 1982).

87

Id.

88

Id. at 313.

89

Air Transport Assoc. of Am. v. City and County of San Francisco, 992 F. Supp. 1149
(N.D. Cal. 1998), affirmed on other grounds, Air. Transport, 1999 LEXIS 8747 (N.D. Cal.
May 27, 1999).
90

Id.

91

The pertinent part of the ordinance reads “[t]he requirements of this Chapter shall apply
to: . . . (iv) any of a contractor’s operations elsewhere in the United States.” S.F. ADMIN.
CODE § 12B.1(d) (1997).
92

Id. at 1159.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol50/iss2/3

16

2002-03]

CIVIL RIGHTS FOR GAYS AND LESBIANS

181

Rocky River v. State Emp. Relations Bd.93, a sharply divided court held that the State’s
collective bargaining law preempted Rocky River’s home rule authority to avoid mandatory
arbitration and settlement under state law.94 The majority held that the collective bargaining
law was an exercise of the state legislature’s power to pass laws “fixing and regulating the
hours of labor, establishing a minimum wage, and providing for the health, safety and general
welfare of all employees” under Article II, section 34 of the Ohio Constitution.95 This Article
also provides that “no other provision of the constitution shall impair or limit this power.”96
Hence, if the court found that Ohio Revised Code sections 125.111 and 153.59 conflicted with
an ordinance requiring domestic partner benefits for employee of contractors, and that the
legislature was acting under its Article II, section 34 powers when it passed these laws, the
ordinance would be invalidated in spite of home rule powers under Article XVIII, section 3.
Is the ordinance an exercise of police power? Language from the arguments cited in the
concurring opinion of Justice Clifford Brown in State ex rel. Evans, supports the view that
contract stipulations are in fact an exercise of police power as opposed to an exercise of
powers of local self-government. In pleading their case, Upper Arlington argued that:
[U]nder Section 3, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution, the Upper Arlington
Ordinance is an exercise of the power to adopt “local police, sanitary and other
similar regulations.” Appellants further contend that the ordinance is a valid
police regulation “not in conflict with general laws” because the prevailing wage
law is not a “general law.”97
If in fact the enactment of the ordinance on DP benefits for contractors were held to be an
exercise of police power, a state law that conflicted with the ordinance would invalidate the
ordinance. Therefore, if the argument that Ohio Revised Code sections 125.111 and 153.59
conflict with such an ordinance prevails, a municipal ordinance requiring contractors to
provide benefits to the domestic partners of their employees would be struck down by the
court.98
III. LEGAL ARGUMENTS UNDER EXISTING FEDERAL LAW
A. Challenges to the Validity of a DP Benefits Ordinance
Local ordinances dealing with non-discrimination are not subject to challenges under
federal law. Opponents of domestic partnership benefits, however, may be able to attack the
validity of such ordinances under federal law. There are three possible avenues of attack.
First, if an ordinance impacts retirement or pension programs that fall under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (hereinafter ERISA) of 1974, it may be held invalid under
federal preemption. Because municipal governments are exempt from regulation under
ERISA, the only ordinance that might be susceptible to such a challenge would be one
requiring private contractors to offer DP benefits to employees as a condition of contracting
with the municipality.99 Second, if the ordinance is found to have impacts on interstate

93

Rocky River v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 539 N.E.2d 103 (Ohio 1989).

94

Id.

95

OHIO CONST. art. II, § 34.

96

Id. at 13.

97

State ex rel. Evans, 431 N.E.2d at 314-15.

98

See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 125.111, 13.59 (Anderson 2002).

99

Municipalities are exempted as part of the general exemption for governmental units in
ERISA provided in 29 U.S.C.A. § 1003(b)(1) (2002). In fact, while many municipalities and a
few states have granted domestic partnership benefits, there has been a reluctance to attempt to
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commerce because of the nature and size of the contractors effected, there is an argument that
the law is preempted by federal sovereignty in the area even if there is no federal law
currently; this is a Dormant Commerce Clause argument. Finally, if an ordinance granting or
mandating benefits is for same-sex couples only, there may be a challenge that the ordinance
discriminates on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The basic
issues and arguments of these three avenues of attack are described below.
1. Challenges Under ERISA
When Congress passed ERISA in 1974, the goal was to ensure that workers were ensured
that pension and retirement benefits would be available in their old age.100 Consequently,
Congress included numerous provisions in the law that prevents states, courts, or private
entities from evading the strong protections the law was meant to provide. The preemption
clause is extremely broad:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this
subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described
in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under section 1003(b) of this title.101
The exception provided under subsection (b) is for the regulation of banking and securities.
“[N]othing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law
of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities.”102 Therefore, if an ordinance
requires that a private employer does effect that employer’s ERISA-qualified plan, there is a
strong argument that the ordinance is preempted.
The Supreme Court has traditionally given an expansive meaning to the ERISA
preemption clause.103 Recently, however, a Supreme Court supportive of states’ rights has
placed some limits on this aspect of the law. In New York State Conference of Blue Cross &
Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.,104 Travelers argued that a state law that treated
HMO’s differentially depending on the insurance company covering the plan was invalid
under the preemption clause because it “related to” an employee benefit plan.105 Even though
the Supreme Court struck down similar laws in previous cases, in upholding the differential
treatment, the Court stated that the purpose of the preemption clause “was to avoid a
multiplicity of regulations in order to permit the nationally uniform administration of

enforce such laws against the private section because of an assumption that ERISA would
preempt the action. See Catherine L. Frisk, Queer Matters: Emerging Issues in Sexual
Orientation Law: ERISA Preemption of State and Local Laws on Domestic Partnership and
Sexual Orientation Discrimination In Employment (Symposium) 8 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 267
(1998).
100

STAFF OF SPECIAL SENATE COMM. ON AGING, 94th CONG., EMPLOYER RETIREMENT
INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974: THE FIRST DECADE, at 625 (1984).
101

29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(a)(2002).

102

29 U.S.C.A.§1144(b) (2002).

103

Richard W. Helms, Case Notes and Comments, Air Transport Association of America v.
City and County of San Francisco: Domestic Partner Benefits Upheld, Except Where
Preempted by ERISA, 27 W. ST. U.L. REV. 323 (1999-2000).
104

New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance
Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
105

Id.
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employee benefit plans” and that the preemption clause, specifically the term “relate to,”
should not be extended “the furthest stretch of its indeterminacy.”106
One case is on point to this issue. In Air Transport Association v. San Francisco,107 the
airline industry challenged the San Francisco ordinance requiring contractors to provide
domestic partnership benefits on ERISA and Dormant Commerce Clause grounds.108 After a
lengthy analysis of preemption law, the court held:
Plaintiffs are entitled to prevail on summary adjudication of their claim that the
ordinance is preempted by ERISA except as follows. With respect to benefits that
are not covered by ERISA, such as moving expenses, memberships and
membership discounts and travel benefits, and with respect to ERISA-covered
benefits that are offered through non-ERISA plans, such as family medical and
bereavement leave that are paid out of general assets, the ordinance is not in any
way preempted by ERISA. With respect to benefits that are covered by ERISA
and provided through ERISA plans, such as family medical and bereavement
leave paid from accumulated funds and health and pension benefits, the ordinance
is preempted as applied to ERISA plans if the city is exercising more economic
power than an ordinary consumer could exercise. Because the city always
exercises such power in its role as proprietor of the airport, the ordinance as
applied to Airport contracts is entirely preempted insofar as it affects ERISA plans
providing ERISA benefits. 109
While this decision prompted a series of articles on how the Court had erred,110 this case
remains the precedent on which to base an assessment.
2. Challenges Under the Dormant Commerce Clause
Because an ordinance that attempts to place restrictions on contractors within the
municipality may have effects on a company outside the city, it is possible that such an action
is precluded by the U.S. Constitution. The Commerce Clause of the United States gives
Congress the power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States.”111 This has been interpreted by the Court to not only empower Congress to pass
legislation, but as reserving the right to regulate interstate commerce to Congress alone.112
As with the ERISA preemption argument, the only case law on this subject comes from
Air Transport. As with the ERISA preemption issue, the court struck down the ordinance in
so far as it related to out-of state conduct:
Plaintiffs are entitled to prevail on summary adjudication of their claim that the
Ordinance is impermissibly extraterritorial to the extent the Ordinance is applied
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in this Article.
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to out-of-State conduct that is not related to the purposes of the City contract.113
With respect to all other applications of the Ordinance, Defendants are entitled to
prevail on summary adjudication of Plaintiffs’ claim that the Ordinance violates
the dormant Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.114
Therefore, Air Transport suggests that any attempt to force the company to provide general
domestic partnership benefits to its employees would not be acceptable. This should not,
however, preclude creating a situation where a special fund is set up to provide domestic
partner benefits during the duration of the contract and only for employees working on that
contract.
3. Challenges Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
By an interesting twist, an ordinance that provides domestic partnership benefits to samesex couples who cannot marry, but which excludes opposite-sex couples who can marry, may
be invalidated on the basis of illegal discrimination based on sex. Two U.S. district court
cases have been decided on this issue, although in both instances the argument was not
successful.
In Cleaves v. City of Chicago,115 a male employee of the City of Chicago wanted to take
family leave to attend the funeral of his female domestic partner. The Chicago ordinance
provided family leave to spouses and bone fide same-sex couples, hence, Mr. Cleaves’ request
was denied.116 In response, Cleaves argued that the ordinance was illegally discriminatory.117
In dismissing the claim for failure to state a valid cause of action, the court found that the
ordinance discriminated on the basis of marital status, not sex, and because marital status is
not protected in Title VII, the claim failed.118
A different approach was taken by the court in Foray v. Bell Atlantic.119 Paul Foray was
an employee of the New York subsidiary of Bell Atlantic. He applied for benefits for his
female domestic partner.120 In denying the request, Atlantic Bell indicated the policy was
limited to same-sex partners only because opposite-sex couples could marry and obtain the
same benefits.121 The court rejected Foray’s claim under the theory that the Title VII standard
questioned whether an individual is treated differently than “similarly situated” people of the
opposite sex.122 However, a female in Foray’s position (with a female domestic partner) could
not marry, and hence, was not “similarly situated.”123 In essence, the inherent sex
discrimination in current marriage laws defeated the claim.124
113

See S.F. ADMIN. CODE § 12B.1(d)(iv) (1997). Note that San Francisco Administrative
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These two cases indicate that this approach would not result in an ordinance providing
domestic partnership benefits to only same-sex partners being invalidated.125
IV. POTENTIAL STATE LEGISLATIVE INTERVENTION AND SUBSEQUENT LEGAL CHALLENGES
Potential legal challenges under existing state and federal laws notwithstanding, it is not
unreasonable to assume that the State legislature might react should a municipality pass a gay
and lesbian civil rights or a DP benefits ordinance, especially one requiring private contractors
to provide such benefits. DP benefits for same-sex couples remain a divisive and politically
loaded subject. Evidence of the tendency for conservative groups to request state legislative
intervention or force a vote on the issue by initiative can be demonstrated in several recent
cases. In February 1998, conservative groups in Maine successfully passed a referendum
repealing civil right laws protecting gays and lesbians from discrimination.126 Likewise, when
the Supreme Court of Alaska was on the verge of holding that state law required provision of
benefits to domestic partners equivalent to those for married couples, the legislature amended
the state’s civil rights law to explicitly allow for discrimination.127 In Ohio, Issue 3
successfully repealed Cincinnati’s civil rights ordinances protecting gays and lesbians.128
Should the legislature pass a law opposing a local ordinance, the analyses of challenges
under existing Ohio law presented in Section two of this Article would have direct application.
The effect of intervention on each of these types of ordinances is discussed below.
A. State Intervention Opposing a Civil Rights Ordinance
If the state legislature felt that gays and lesbians were making too much headway at the
local level in gaining civil rights protections, they could conceivably pass a law forbidding
municipalities to enact such ordinances and invalidating existing ones. Even if such a state
law were passed, however, there are strong arguments that an issue of how citizens of a
municipality are treated within a municipality is purely a matter of substantive local selfgovernment. As such, the conflicting state law would probably not invalidate the ordinance.129
In addition, the state may also be barred from passing a Constitutional Amendment to
prohibit municipalities from passing such laws. In Romer v. Evans,130 the U.S. Supreme Court
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However, not everyone agrees with this analysis. A commentator remarked on the
Cleaves and Foray decisions that:
Although the courts in the two cases dismissed such a claim, Title VII authority not
considered by those courts supports the claim and undermines the analysis in those
cases and their conclusions that same-sex-only policies comply with Title VII. A
clear, but little-noticed, line of Title VII cases holds that disparate treatment based on
the race of a person with whom an individual associates constitutes discrimination
because of the individual’s race. Other Title VII authority supports recognition of an
analogous rule under Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination. Applying such a
rule and applicable Title VII sex discrimination case law, this Article concludes that
domestic partnership benefits policies limited to employees in same-sex domestic
partner-ships discriminate on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII.
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invalidated a Colorado constitutional amendment that prohibited any state or local
governmental entity from enacting any law providing protection to individuals on the basis of
sexual orientation.131 The Court reasoned that the ordinance had no rationale basis or
relationship to a valid state purpose, and therefore, under rational scrutiny, failed to meet the
requirements of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.132 This decision
was widely hailed as a major victory for gay and lesbian civil rights.
Romer, however, does not prevent municipalities from passing anti-gay ordinances. This
issue was addressed by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Equality Foundation of
Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati.133 In this case, the constitutionality of a municipal
charter amendment passed by the voters of Cincinnati (Issue 3) was challenged on the grounds
that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution.134 In holding that the
charter amendment was valid, the court distinguished the case from Romer by identifying two
important differences:
(1) it applied only at the lowest (municipal) level of government and thus could
not dispossess gay Cincinnatians of any rights derived from any higher level of
state law and enforced by a superior apparatus of state government, and (2) its
narrow, restrictive language could not be construed to deprive homosexuals of all
legal protections even under municipal law, but instead eliminated only “special
class status” and “preferential treatment” for gays as gays under Cincinnati
ordinances and policies, leaving untouched the application, to gay citizens, of any
and all legal rights generally accorded by the municipal government to all persons
as persons.135
Hence, while Romer may mean that the state cannot stop municipalities from passing civil
rights for gays and lesbians, it does not prevent individual municipalities from denying them.
B. State Intervention Opposing Granting of DP Benefits to Municipal Employees
The recent experience in the city of Lakewood, Ohio indicates that if a major city in Ohio
decided to grant domestic partnership benefits to its employees, there would almost certainly
be a legislative reaction at the state level. In general, the bill would probably take the form of
an act specifically requiring that no state government subdivision could provide benefits to
unmarried partners of employees. Because governmental units are exempted from ERISA,
this law would not face a federal preemption challenge. Hence, the question would become
one of whether the city ordinance granting the benefits would supercede the state law.
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A convincing argument is to be made that Benevolent Association v. Parma,136 is the
controlling authority on this matter. In that decision, the court emphatically stated that “[i]t
has been firmly established that he ability to determine the salaries paid to city employees is a
fundamental power of local self government.”137 The approach of the court in Rocky River
casts doubt on this certainty. Using Rocky River State Employment Relations Bd.,138 however,
it could be argued that the legislature’s decision to regulate benefits was made under its
powers granted under Article II, section 34 of the Ohio Constitution. As such, it is not subject
to the municipal powers granted under Article XVIII, section 3. One counter to this argument
is dicta found in State ex rel. Paluf v. Feneli,139 a per curiam decision delivered five years
after Rocky River. In Paluf, the majority opined, “[t]he phrase ‘not in conflict with general
laws’ does not modify the ‘powers of local government’ language of the Constitution;
therefore, Section 3, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution empowers municipalities to enact
requirements for employees which differ from those set forth in the Revised Code.”140 In
reality, should such a case ever reach the Supreme Court of Ohio, the arguments would sound
much like they did in Rocky River. Just as in that case, the ultimate outcome would depend on
the political make-up of the court, not on the strength or weakness of any particular legal
argument.
C. State Intervention Opposing Ordinance Requiring DP Benefits from Contractors
In this case, the state is probably barred from passing laws regarding benefits because of
ERISA preemption. The state, however, could pass a law forbidding contract stipulations
associated with benefits. Because the law itself would be dealing with contracts, not benefits,
it would probably not be subject to ERISA preemption. Because it seems likely that any
ordinance of this type would be invalidated under ERISA preemption; however, the impact of
potential state intervention in this area is probably a moot point.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
It can be seen from the analyses in this Article that ordinances which grant domestic
partnership benefits and/or civil rights to gays and lesbians will probably face a complex
gambit of legal challenges under state law, federal law, and both State and U.S. Constitutions.
Current law and current common practice in the State, however, indicates that municipalities
probably have almost unfettered power to pass ordinances that either grant protection or deny
protection to gays and lesbians in the area of employment and housing discrimination within
the municipalities jurisdiction.
The situation is not as clear when it comes to domestic partnership benefits. It is likely
that under current law, an ordinance granting domestic partnership benefits to employees of a
municipality would be upheld in court. The challenge would be whether the ordinance could
withstand the political pressure to which it would most certainly endure. The recent failure of
Lakewood to pass just such an ordinance is an example of how divisive and problematic such
an issue is. If in fact, a municipality did pass such an ordinance, there would be significant
pressure placed on the state legislature to preempt that ordinance and others like it. While
recent Ohio Supreme Court decisions seem to indicate that the ordinance may withstand such
a challenge the experience of the litigation in Rocky River demonstrates that the politics of the
issue may well be more important than any legal analysis.
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Finally, it is relatively clear that ordinances requiring contractors to provide domestic
partnership benefits to their employees as a condition of contracting with the municipality
have limited validity under federal law. The ordinance in San Francisco, while still standing,
has limited impact.
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